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Abstract 
Most markets have evolved as buyers and sellers constantly search for ways to create 
value, however this has not occurred naturally in all areas of the economy – markets 
are missing for some goods, including  the environment. In such cases, transaction 
costs linked to property rights, asymmetric and hidden information and packaging 
problems have often prevented otherwise valuable deals from being negotiated in 
relation to the environment. However new capabilities and a better knowledge and 
understanding of the problems at hand  now mean that where the objective is clear, 
and the knowledge, skills and capability exist to understand, model and measure the 
relevant characteristics of the problem  transaction costs are low enough that 
economists can, in certain cases, design market based instruments that match demand 
with supply. In general the findings from the National MBI Pilot Program indicate 
that cap-and-trade systems, auctions and offsets systems can be effective tools to 
achieve natural resource management.  The type of mechanism that is appropriate in a 
particular circumstance will depend on the transaction costs involved, which are 
strongly influenced by the features of the problem at hand. Mechanisms therefore 
require careful design to ensure they are tailored to each particular case. 
                                                   
1  Much of t his paper is based on extractions from the  National Market Based 
Instrument Pilot Grogram Round One: An Interim Report (2005) which was compiled 
and edited by the authors of this paper with and on behalf of the National Market 
Based Instrument Working Group, based on interviews conducted with the pilot 
managers, pilot reports and further research and analysis.     3 
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1. Introduction 
In open decentralised economies, markets are the primary institution through which 
individuals and firms engage in transactions that create value. Markets facilitate 
interactions between buyers and sellers by offering a cost-effective and reliable way 
of transacting.   
Most markets have not been designed. They evolve and are shaped by the interests of 
buyers and sellers who are constantly looking for ways to create value. This 
evolutionary process discards inefficient ways of making transactions, i.e. those with 
uncompetitive transaction costs. Different types of transactions emerge to suit the 
particular characteristics of the goods and services in question. Transactions in 
commodity markets, for example, are quite different from those that occur in risk 
markets.  
Markets have not evolved in all areas of the economy – they are missing for some 
goods and services. However, this does not necessarily diminish the potential value of 
the transactions that would occur if a lower cost way could be found for them to 
occur.   
Environmental and natural resource management (NRM) problems are usually at the 
difficult end of the policy spectrum. There are often complex spatial and temporal 
interactions between the causes of environmental problems and their effects; similar   4 
actions tend to generate different  (non -standard) environmental impacts in different 
locations and at different times. Some environmental benefits tend to be generated in 
association with others. For example, biodiversity enhancement through revegetation 
retention may be jointly produced with water quality improvements and salinity 
mitigation. Many different stakeholders, each with potentially different objectives, 
expectations, motivations and cost structures, are involved in the production and 
consumption of environmental outcomes.  
Markets in this area tend to fail  in part  because of the public good nature of 
environmental goods and services. There are two characteristics of public goods that 
prevent markets from emerging. The first is non-excludability. Individuals do not own 
environmental amenities, such as clean air or clean water. Yet it may not be possible 
to exclude them from enjoying the benefits of these environmental amenities, and 
similarly from experiencing costs for example due to their pollution. Secondly, many 
environmental goods and services are non-rival, which means that enjoyment of the 
environment by one individual does not preclude enjoyment by others (at least up to 
certain levels). 
We know that, in aggregate at least, society is willing to pay for an increase in the 
supply of environmental goods, and that the potential suppliers of these environmental 
goods exist. Yet markets do not necessarily develop. Willingness to pay for 
environmental goods and the cost of supplying these goods varies. Environmental 
goods often lack definition and the benefits from a potential exchange with suppliers 
of these goods may be uncertain or risky. Harnessing or collecting information about 
society’s willingness to pay for environmental goods is problematic, individuals may   5 
expect to ‘free-ride’ the benefits produced by others purchasing environmental goods 
resulting in the under investment of that good. 
As a result g overnments have intervened to increase the level of investment in 
conservation activities in order to meet society's expectations. Government addressed 
society’s demand for environmental goods or services’ using the tools it understood 
were available at the time, given the information and technology available. In the past 
this has meant that governments have tended to approach environmental problems 
through regulatory approaches, education and awareness programs, industry 
supported voluntary approaches and various types of relatively simple incentive 
schemes delivered by government or by catchment bodies. For example, regulations 
have been used to restrict activities such as the clearing of native vegetation and to 
require firms causing air pollution to adopt particular technologies, whereas 
incentives schemes have been used to promote voluntary participation and 
behavioural change leading to improved environmental outcomes.    
Although these programs have raised community awareness of environmental issues, 
in many cases they have not been sufficient to solve the complex environmental 
issues currently experienced in Australia, such as decreasing water quality, increasing 
salinity and biodiversity decline. 
New m arket b ased approaches involve the design and implementation of a system 
whereby those who have the best:  
•  access to information about taking actions that deliver benefits; 
•  information about the opportunity and direct costs of taking those actions; 
•  information about the benefits of those actions; and,    6 
•  ability to access information about aggregate willingness to pay for benefits; 
interact to make exchanges that benefit themselves and deliver environmental benefits 
at lower cost than alternative mechanisms. Those with information about benefits and 
willingness to pay, or potential buyers of environmental goods and services include 
society (through government and catchment bodies) and groups of individuals such as 
farmers who would choose to take action to, say, protect land from salinity threats. 
Given appropriate incentives, many landholders, who have information about the 
opportunity cost of supply, could change land-uses in ways  that will increase the 
supply of environmental goods and services. Where there are willing buyers and 
willing sellers, it is reasonable to suggest that deals between buyers and sellers would 
benefit both groups. In economics terms, these exchanges are the basis of wealth 
creation in society.  
Unfortunately there have been gaps and limitations in our knowledge and 
understanding that have meant the implementation of market systems whereby these 
players interact  to achieve the efficient outcome may  have involved excessive 
transaction costs in order to deliver the necessary benefits.  
2. Transaction Costs and NRM Policy 
2.1 Previous Impediments to Markets for Environmental Outcomes 
Transaction costs, the costs that are attached to the (potential) transactions that could 
enhance the provision of environmental goods, include costs due to:  
•  property rights such as costs associated with the definition, monitoring and 
enforcement of property rights and determining previously hidden information   7 
in order to define or m onitor a property right and the cost of enforcement due 
to the communities understanding and acceptance of the property right and its 
allocation; 
•  asymmetric  and hidden information, through either having to estimate or 
reveal supply or demand related information held by one group or party and 
not another, or not held by anyone, and the risk associated with making a deal 
without full information ; 
•  the packaging of actions, outcomes or preferences of players within the 
economy in order to determine the efficient aggregate outcome. 
The significance of some of these types of transaction costs has often been enough to 
prevent otherwise valuable deals from being negotiated in relation to the environment. 
As a result,  impediments to naturally occurring markets for environmental goods and 
services developing have included: 
2.1.1 Inappropriate Property Rights 
The lack of or inappropriate specification of property rights for environmental goods 
is known to result in inefficient or missing markets for these goods. Coase (1960) 
suggested that if property rights were clearly specified, and there were no transaction 
costs, firms would trade to arrive at an efficient outcome. However, in the case of 
environmental goods, property rights and transaction cost issues are linked, and the 
transaction costs cannot be ignored. In order for the transactions, or the exchange of 
rights, to be sufficiently credible for agents to be willing to participate, there must be 
high acceptance of the link between the rights specified and the environmental 
outcomes sought as well as acceptance of the security of those rights.    8 
For some goods property rights have not been well defined because in the past  the 
science and information necessary to define or monitor and enforce  them was not 
available at an acceptable cost. In other cases demand for an environmental good may 
not have been realised when the relevant property rights were being shaped.  
For example, a conservation agency attempting to reconstruct a wetland to satisfy the 
community’s demand for local native wildlife  may require farmers w hose water 
extraction impacts the wetland to take certain actions twice yearly that would result in 
the wetland flooding to simulate natural conditions. However, the property rights for 
the water used by farmers are in the form of annual licences that are significantly 
more expensive than the benefits to be gained from flooding the wetland.  Purchasing 
the licences outright is costly, considering the agency only requires water twice 
yearly. However, altering the p roperty right to pay farmers not to extract water at a 
certain time twice yearly could be risky if it is costly for the agency to monitor and 
enforce whether the local farmers do as they agreed. 
2.1.2 Asymmetric and Hidden Information 
Information asymmetry  refers to a situation where one party to a deal has more 
relevant knowledge than the other party. This can mean that it is hazardous for the 
uninformed party to do business with the party who has the hidden information. 
Akerlof (1970) showed that the existence of asymmetric information (that is, where 
one party is informed about certain aspects of the economics problem and the other is 
not) can render some seemingly competitive markets inefficient. In extreme cases, 
this phenomenon can prevent markets being formed because the uninformed party is 
liable to be exploited and may therefore be unwilling to participate. As a result, the 
potential benefits of doing business (which may be very large) may not be realised.   9 
Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort (1997) explain how information asymmetry 
affects the functioning of markets for environmental goods and services associated 
with private land. There is a “clear presence of information asymmetry in that farmers 
know better than the program administrator about how participation (in conservation 
auctions) would affect their production plans and profit.”  
In the wetland example, the conservation agency  may  not have information about the 
community’s willingness to pay for native wildlife (held by individual members of the 
community).  Ecological and hydrological  information  about the  different possible 
actions farmers could take to contribute to creating the wetland, and information 
about how much  native habitat those actions would deliver and how much that habitat 
would contribute to an improvement in native wildlife may be hidden from the 
agency .  Information asymmetry may also exist as the agency  does not have 
information about the opportunity costs to farmers of taking actions that will deliver 
the wetland.  Without this information it is risky for the agency to engage in 
transactions in an attempt to deliver habitat for native wildlife through the wetland, as 
it is unable to determine whether any deals it makes are valuable or not.  
2.1.3 Packaging Problems 
In some situations, markets may be missing because firms do not have the right 
combination and/or critical mass of assets or access rights to conduct their business. 
This is sometimes referred to as ‘the packaging problem’ (Ausubel and Milgrom 
2002).  
Asset aggregation problems arise in many parts of economy, including the allocation 
of access to infrastructure such as transport networks, gas pipelines, airport landing   10 
slots, mobile phone spectrums, sales of real estate to developers, access to certain 
mineral deposits, and the creation of wildlife corridors.   
For the economy at large, sub-optimal allocation  can occur  due to failing to 
adequately address  packaging problems.  If firms risk being unable to achieve a 
satisfactory package and do not want to be left with a subcritical package (i.e. a 
package that will not be sufficient to create a viable business), they are unlikely to 
participate in the market. For example, key players may choose not to participate in 
resource allocation events in which they cannot be certain of securing combinations of 
resources critical for business viability and resources may remain underdeveloped. 
Addressing the packaging problem offers increased value from resource allocation 
through allowing resources to be combined in the most valuable way. 
In the wetland example, i f the conservation agency can not be sure of securing the 
simultaneous action of enough land holders coordinated  at an appropriate time to 
simulate a naturally occurring flood of the wetland area, it may not consider making 
any deals.  
2.2 Reductions in Transaction Costs 
Fortunately, new information and capabilities open up the prospect of developing new 
approaches that complement the suite of current policy mechanisms.  Transaction 
costs that have previously impeded such approaches are being reduced through new 
capabilities and better knowledge and understanding of the problems at hand. 
Economists have shown that, in certain circumstances, they are now able to design 
and implement new types of  market  mechanisms that allow previously missing 
transactions to occur.    11 
Recent developments that  are being used to  overcome the problems that have 
previously prevented the evolution of markets for environmental goods and services 
include: 
2.2.1 Property Rights 
Developments in scientific m odels now provide us with information that assists in 
determining more appropriate forms of property right and in many cases it is clearer 
what characteristics of a property right may impact on the environmental outcome. 
Consider again the wetland example, where better science and hydrology models now 
provide the agency with information that it is not only the quantity of water used by 
landholders upstream that is important, but the timing of that use in conjunction with 
rainfall events, and the extent of g roundwater extraction close to stream.  Now it is 
not only clear that purchasing an annually renewable licence to extract water is not 
appropriate due to the duration of the right, but that the timing of the forgone 
extraction in relation to rainfall events is important, as is the timing of the separate 
right to extract groundwater.  
The ability to monitor environmental outcomes, or actions that predictably impact on 
environmental outcomes, provides the opportunity to design property rights that better 
enable valuable environmental deals to be made.  Environmental goods are often 
jointly supplied with many other goods, or serve to achieve different outcomes. For 
example, the efficient property right for water used exclusively for irrigation purposes 
will be v ery different to the efficient property right for water used exclusively for 
aquatic health. Where water has multiple uses redefining the property right to achieve 
what may be the efficient outcome in relation to one use may cause excessive costs in 
relation to other  uses. However, the ability to monitor environmental outcomes and   12 
actions at lower cost means that deals can be made to alter the standard property right 
in certain cases using well designed contracts that are monitored at low cost. This 
enables tailored transactions to be made to suit the different types of uses. 
The community’s increasing understanding and acceptance of the importance of many 
environmental issues also means the cost of enforcing both standard property rights 
and contracts designed to achieve environmental outcomes is reducing. Where 
community understanding and acceptance is poor, enforcement costs are likely to be 
high due to political costs of imposing tough penalties for actions the community does 
not see as significant, in addition to the logistical costs of catching those deliberately 
disregarding the property rights set in place. 
2.2.2 Asymmetric and Hidden Information 
Economic theory involves the application of theoretical frameworks that explore 
aspects relating to the exchange of goods and services, including analysis of the 
efficiency of markets and the reasons why they may be inefficient or missing. The 
evolution of this form of analysis, which can include game theory and information 
economics, (the analysis of the econo mic incentives that result in trades and markets 
and the information necessary to allow the relevant parties to participate in a way that 
creates value)  is enabling economists to design mechanisms that overcome 
impediments to exchange. E conomists  can now d esign new mechanisms  that 
specifically target asymmetric information problems. These mechanisms induce the 
use or revelation of asymmetric information in order to identify transactions that have 
the potential to create the most value (provide the greatest benefit at least cost).    13 
As potential participants in environmental transactions become familiar with these 
mechanisms they realise that the risks previously associated with making such 
transactions due to information asymmetry diminish and they are more  likely to enter 
the market. 
The improvement in  transparent and replicable scientific models and measurement 
techniques also reduces transaction costs due to  hidden  information  problems 
associated with exchanges involving environmental goods as outcomes (or actions) 
are able to be confirmed at lower cost. 
Using the wetland example, developments in science may help inform the agency 
about landholder actions that will cause flooding of the wetland, and the extent to 
which the provision of this habitat is likely to translate to an increase in local wildlife. 
Economists can design a mechanism  that the agency can implement that use the 
relative opportunity costs of  surrounding landholders to determine the transactions 
necessary to deliver the wetland objective at least total cost. 
Arguably a current gap exists in our capability to reveal hidden information in that the 
accurate revelation of the willingness of the community to pay for native wildlife 
remains problematic. Public good characteristics, a lack of familiarity with purchasing 
environmental goods, and lack of information and understanding about the 
contribution that different amounts of different environmental goods make to their 
utility  mean that individuals’ abilities and incentives to identify and reveal  this 
information are weak. Government may make assumptions using information 
revealed through the political process in order to determine the funding for the agency 
to create the wetland, or the agency may be forced to use member donations to fund 
the wetland, knowing that many within the community are likely to be free-riding. To   14 
date stated preference and contingent valuation techniques have generally been unable 
to provide willingness to pay estimates with a significant degree of confidence. 
2.2.3 Packaging Problems 
New computational capabilities can overcome some of the impediments that may be 
preventing markets from evolving. This is particularly relevant to the asset packaging 
problem.  
Economists can now design special types of auctions to resolve many packaging 
problems (for examples, see Plott et al. (1981) and Rassenti et al. (1982)).  The 
capacity to hold auctions that involve relatively simple bidding systems and use 
computer algorithms to analyse preferences for packages of items over single items or 
alternative packages and determine the combination of packages that create the most 
value (electronic combinatorial auctions, sometimes called ‘smart auctions’) now 
exists. This capacity provides those who have packaging problems with the potential 
to  use ‘smart auctions’ to greatly reduce the large transaction costs previously 
associated with revealing the necessary  information. This process allows participants 
in markets to get the exact package of assets or access needed to create viable 
businesses.  
Many of t he problems associated with aggregating the community’s preferences 
remain. As discussed in the previous section, revelation of willingness to pay for a 
public good is problematic. Unless they are identical individuals’ relative preferences 
may not usefully be aggregated.    
Consider once more the wetland example. The agency may have a number of options 
available to solve the packaging problem of needing to engage the right combination   15 
of landholders for the same period to deliver the flood in order to make any one deal 
worthwhile. Achieving an aggregate quantity of water flow is important, and that 
requires individual landholder  actions/outcomes to occur  all  at the same time. 
Designing a system that allows the agency to determine the time at which it is able to 
achieve the wetland flood at least cost  (through making a simultaneous deal with  a 
combination  of landholders at a particular time) is needed to solve the aggregation 
problem.  Solving aggregation problems generally requires a greater two way 
exchange of information about supply and demand, this may be delivered for example 
through a continuous simultaneous process, or through the use of multiple rounds. If 
the benefits delivered from using a mechanism designed to solve the aggregation 
problem, such as a computer software system or a multiple round bidding process, are 
likely to be significantly greater than the costs, the agency may be able to deliver the 
wetland where otherwise the packaging problem  may have posed too great a risk for 
the agency to consider making deals. 
2.2.4 Mechanism Design Methodology 
Recent developments, including new ideas about mechanism design, science and 
technology and contract design create the prospect of designing specific procedures 
that enable individuals to interact in ways that allow potentially valuable transactions 
to proceed. However, designing these mechanisms so that they are efficient and 
effective is not an easy or costless task.  
Roth (2001) observes that a methodology has been evolving to assist economists to 
design policy mechanisms where markets or other institutions are missing. This new 
methodology, called mechanism design, is being used to assist with the design and 
testing of these new approaches. Pioneered by Plott and Smith (as noted in Roth   16 
2001), this systematic approach identifies the root causes of missing markets, 
proposes specific mechanisms that will allow transactions to proceed, and tests and 
modifies these mechanisms in economics laboratories and field pilots.  It provides 
tools to road-test and refine mechanisms and to examine whether they are practical, 
efficient and effective.  Experiments and field pilots are particularly useful when 
policy makers are faced with specific problems for which economic theory is unclear 
and there is no practical, relevant experience. 
3. The National Market Based Instrument Pilot Program 
3.1  Market Based Instruments 
Market based instruments (MBIs) are "tools" that use a range of market -like 
approaches to influence the behaviour of people, in the case of the National Market 
Based Instrument Pilot Program (NMBIPP), in order to achieve environmental and 
NRM outcomes.  
To influence the behaviour of individuals within the economy MBIs generally involve 
systems that allow parties to make individual choices based on the information that is 
relevant to them. Informational requirements and exchange are often larger for a MBI 
than for alternative policy tools.  Revealing  or exchanging  this information  may 
require a sophisticated process or technology. Outcomes must be measurable in order 
to evaluate cost-effectiveness and attain dynamic efficiency.  Measuring outcomes 
involves converting scientific data into what is referred to as a "metric", this is 
something that informs the party with a demand for an environmental good about the 
estimated quantum of environmental good provided through an exchange.    17 
In  the past in  many cases the technology and information necessary to design and 
implement instruments that could achieve the potential gains from trade was not 
available except at excessively large transaction costs. New ideas and capabilities now 
mean that  MBIs can be designed to allow players to interact to achieve society’s 
environmental objectives at considerably less cost than has previously been possible. 
As society’s consumption of traditional goods increases, and as incomes grow causing 
society’s demand for conservation to increase, ensuring that markets for 
environmental goods are designed to deliver environmental benefits efficiently will 
become increasingly important and failing to do so will become increasingly costly. 
MBIs do not stand alone. To be cost-effective they require the appropriate regulatory 
setting and in many cases a level of education of the parties involved. MBIs will not 
be cost-effective means of delivering all environmental outcomes.  For example, 
where opportunity costs are not large and some demand for the NRM outcome lies 
with potential suppliers it may be that voluntary approaches will continue to be 
important. Government grants based systems may be cost-effective where there is no 
heterogeneity in the environmental goods produced by potential suppliers, and so on.   
Some argue that the level of transaction costs involved in MBIs, for example through 
modelling and measuring environmental  outcomes, making  field visits  or  through 
entering individual contracts, make  them  less cost effective  policy tools than they 
appear. This is not necessarily the case. The additional level of benefits that MBIs are 
able to deliver as a result of incurring the transaction costs, where there is  some 
heterogeneity, can reduce the net transaction costs of a well designed MBI compared 
to available alternatives.   18 
3.2  Pilots in the National MBI Pilot Program 
The NMBIPP investigates  MBIs through funding pilots conducted in the field to 
demonstrate, familiarise and refine these instruments.  Other pilots are being 
conducted in the laboratory with human participants participating in economic 
experiments to test new  policy settings or  design aspects of MBIs, often where 
implementation in the field would be costly without testing and refining them first. 
Eleven pilots were funded  for a total of approximately five million dollars under the 
National Pilot Program  throughout Australia. More detail on the pilots and their 
findings can be found on   the website  http://www.napswq.gov.au/mbi/pubs/interim-
report.pdf. Table 1 illustrates the spread of the pilot characteristics.  
The NMBIPP funded cap-and-trade approaches (salinity and water quality), auction 
approaches (biodiversity, water quality, carbon sequestration and salinity), offsets 
(salinity), an insurance approach (wind erosion) and a leverage fund approach 
(salinity, biodiversity, carbon sequestration and water quality). Cap-and-trade and 
offsets are alternative approaches to an environmental problem associated with a set 
limit or critical target that society wishes to meet at least cost. The Program also 
funded three alternative approaches to address the objective of cost-effectively 
achieving quantifiable environmental outcomes: the leverage (gap funding) approach, 
insurance and auctions.     
3.4  Findings Related to Mechanism Types 
In general the findings from the National MBI Pilot Program indicate that, in certain 
conditions, with prerequisites satisfied, cap-and-trade systems, auctions and offsets   19 
systems can be effective tools to achieve NRM objectives.  This section presents  a 
brief summary of the key findings of Round One of the NMBIPP in relation to 
auctions, cap a nd trade systems and offsets.  For information on leverage and 
insurance mechanisms and for further information on auctions, offsets and cap and 
trade systems see the NMBIWG Interim Report and the pilot final reports, available 
on  http://www.napswq.gov.au/mbi/index.html. 
3.4.1   Auctions 
An auction is a mechanism designed to maximise the value created from allocating a 
resource (usually an asset or a contract) to competing firms or individuals. It does this 
through creating a short-lived market with a set of rules that regulate the way buyers 
and sellers interact.  
Auctions have been used to allocate resources for centuries. However it was only in 
1997 that Latacz -Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort contended that auctions could be 
designed to efficiently achieve lan d-use change for natural resource management.  
Given limited resources, choosing  the actions  that will maximise environmental 
benefit requires information about the costs of different management  actions, the 
environmental benefits available from the different actions and their relative 
importance. This information is asymmetrically distributed: landholders know their 
opportunity costs, but government may be in the best position to estimate the relative 
importance, or benefit to society, of different aspects within and between 
environmental outcomes. Well-designed auctions harness competition between 
landholders to reveal information about the costs to landholders of producing   20 
environmental outcomes so that the agency can pursue those contracts that provide the 
most value.  
Round One of the NMBIPP found that auctions can be a cost-effective means by 
which to increase the provision of diffuse-source environmental outcomes, including 
terrestrial biodiversity, salinity mitigation, aquatic biodiversity and water quality. The 
auction-based MBI pilots investigated whether auctions for services to provide 
environmental goods offered by landholders have the ability to outperform 
instruments previously used to obtain these goods, such as grants and fixed input price 
schemes. The pilot auction  run  in Western  Australia was found to be almost three 
times more cost–effective than a hypothetical input-based scheme (White and Burton, 
2005). Another pilot found that moving from the current fixed price scheme to an 
auction for biodiversity and water quality services in Onkaparinga (SA) would cost an 
estimated $100 000 up-front, but that the auction would be between 23 and 34 per 
cent more cost-effective once in place (NMBIPP Working Group 2005). These 
estimates involve and number of assumptions and should be interpreted with caution.  
3.4.2   Cap and Trade 
Where the environmental objective involves a common threshold, m arkets for point-
source emission problems can be created by placing a ‘cap’ or limit on the production 
of an  unwanted  environmental outcome. Clearly defined shares of the cap, often 
referred to as permits, are then allocated between landholders (including firms) in the 
area. These actions create a market in which individuals will trade permits to 
maximise their returns, minimising the total cost of meeting the cap.   21 
Cap-and-trade systems rely on a regulatory cap and the powers necessary to enforce 
that cap. In a cap-and-trade system, each firm uses private information about 
opportunity costs and private values to determine the best combination of output and 
emissions (or consumption). Private firms can purchase rights to emit as they expand, 
or sell rights to emit as they discover ways to reduce pollution, or scale back on 
production. As rights are bought and sold for firms to expand or reduce pollution, 
information exchange occurs between buyers and sellers and through this process 
prices for emission permits are discovered.  
Cap and trade systems require a  legal partial property right be specified. The 
implementing agen cy requires adequate legal authority and jurisdiction to enforce the 
cap, and must have the capacity to administer and monitor the system. Property rights 
must be assigned to individuals or firms. A system must be designed to enable trade in 
the property r ights, including conditions for trade and processes for exchanging 
information. For the cost of setting up a trading system to be worth incurring, trades 
must occur. This requires sufficient sources of potential environmental damage, and 
abatement cost heterogeneity among these sources.  
Where science enables sources of environmental damage to be monitored or 
modelled, there are numerous examples of the successful employment of cap-and-
trade systems to meet a regulatory cap.  Previous successful applications, such as the 
Hunter River salinity trading scheme, water markets in Australia and other countries, 
and the nitrogen oxide and regional clean air markets in the United States, have been 
subject to stringent regulations prior to the introduction of the cap-and-trade system 
(Whitten et al. 2005).    22 
3.4.3   Offsets 
A pure command-and-control approach prohibits actions leading to a certain outcome. 
An offsets system allows a firm to take those actions, provided the firm also takes 
compensatory action so that the overall environmental outcome at least remains the 
same. For example, where expanded production is expected to result in increased 
nutrient emissions into a river, a regulatory approach may refuse to grant the permit to 
expand.  An offsets system grants permission (for example, through a permit or a 
licence) to increase production and direct emissions, provided the firm also takes 
action such that total nutrient emissions into the river either improve or remain 
unchanged. To implement an offsets system, an agency requires a regulatory hook to 
enforce the offsetting of environmental damage. 
As there are many potential ways that offsets may be sourced, offsets systems may 
look very different to one another. Where the demand for offsets is sufficient more 
sophisticated mechanisms to source offsets are likely to reduce the transaction costs 
associated with an offsets system.  
Scientific rules that qualify offsets must be stringent because the primary objective in 
cases where offsets may be considered is ‘no net loss in an environmental outcome’.  
Because offsets systems limit a particular type of environmental damage but allow 
firms to meet that limit with greater flexibility, offsets bear some similarities to and 
can form part of a cap-and-trade systems.    23 
4  Designing Market Based Instruments 
4.1  MBI Design Considerations 
One of the biggest risks with the current enthusiasm for MBIs arguably lies in the 
popularity of well known “trademark” MBIs, such as the BushTender auctions. There 
is a tendency for agencies to believe they can pick up and use exactly the same design 
as a previously applied MBI to address environmental problems that they face in their 
region or to achieve a different environmental outcome. This entails the risk that 
although some situations may appear similar, changes in different characteristics 
including among many other things, the functioning of the ecosystem, the 
characteristics and number of landholders involved, the institutional setting, and the 
information held by different parties that can have significant implications for the 
effective design of the mechanism, will not be recognised and the mechanism will fail 
to deliver the environmental objective cost effectively.  Other agencies may then 
observe this failure as one due to that type of market based instrument not being cost 
effective, whereas it was actually a failure of the agency to design the instrument to 
achieve their objective given the particular characteristics of the problem they faced. 
It is therefore important to ensure the appropriate skill and capabilities are involved in 
determining the appropriate instrument design to achieve the objective given the 
characteristics at hand. An efficient market based instrument can be designed by 
people with the appropriate knowledge, skill and experience applying the following 
basic principles:   24 
i  Objective 
Before a mechanism can begin to be designed, the objective must be clearly identified 
and articulated. Examples of environmental objectives include the desire to meet a 
critical threshold, or to satisfy a willingness to pay for an environmental good. 
ii  Characteristics of the Problem 
To be cost effective, a mechanism must be designed to achieve the desired objective 
at least total (including transaction) cost. To do this, the characteristics of the problem 
that have the potential to impact significantly on the transaction costs involved in 
different design features must be recognised and understood. This includes 
understanding the landscape, the players involved, the science available, the 
interactions within the landscape and between players, and the institutional setting.  
iii  Matching Demand and Supply Cost Effectively 
Designing the mechanism that will match demand and supply cost effectively will 
require consideration of the  appropriate p roperty right or form of contract, the 
information held by or available to the respective parties, the transaction costs that the 
use of different design features will involve, and the benefits that different design 
features are likely to achieve. An understanding of the transaction costs that are likely 
to be incurred on the ground for different mechanism designs may be important, field 
officers may have the most accurate estimate of this information. The inclusion of 
field officers in the mechanism design phase therefore becomes important. 
Science and technology is used to measure or model the unit of exchange involved in 
transactions that occur through the mechanism. Without being able to measure the   25 
environmental good or to model the environmental good that will arise as a result of 
an action, the benefits of different transactions can not be identified and the cost 
effective transactions are not apparent. In cases where general rules of thumb provide 
accurate estimates, the transaction costs of employing sophisticated science may not 
capture a significant increase in benefits such that the use of that science is 
worthwhile. However, where rules of thumb do not provide good estimates of the 
environmental outcome, incurring increased gross transaction costs from the use of 
sophisticated science and modelling is likely to produce a substantial increase in 
benefits, thus result in lower net transaction costs (a lower cost-benefit ratio overall).  
The Catchment Modelling Framework used in the EcoTender pilot (an auction for 
multiple outcomes run in Victoria) found rules of thumb did not provide good 
estimates of environmental benefit at all in the area in which the pilot was applied 
(Eigenraam et al. 2005). 
4.2 The Appropriateness of Different MBIs 
There are many different forms of MBIs that have potential to be cost effective in 
situations with different characteristics.  Auctions, offsets and cap and trade systems 
will each  be appropriate in different circumstances. Other mechanisms, for example 
labelling systems, taxes, fees, subsidies and grants may be cost effective in other 
situations. In this paper the focus is placed on those mechanisms that round one of the 
NMBIPP showed, given good design and the right situation, are ready  to be 
implemented more widely, this section continues to do so. 
As discussed in the preceding section, for each application  a mechanism must be 
carefully designed to suit the circumstance at hand. However, there are a number of   26 
common characteristics that can inform the basic form of mechanism (for example, 
auction, offset or cap and trade) that is likely to be suitable in a particular case. This 
section discusses some of these characteristics. Although it may be clear that a 
particular mechanism is likely to be suited to a particular problem  t here are many 
subtle design features within a basic type of mechanism that if not correctly 
interpreted and addressed can cause the mechanism to fail where it could otherwise 
have been successful.  
Some common characteristics that can inform whether an auction, cap and trade or 
offset type mechanism is likely to be appropriate are: 
•  The nature of public understanding and acceptance of the objective; 
•  The extent of costs associated with measuring and monitoring the unit of 
exchange;  
•  The extent of land holder knowledge about alternative methods of production 
of the environmental good; and, 
•  The number of players involved in the supply and/or demand of the 
environmental good. 
Some of the implications that these characteristics can have on the appropriateness of 
the mechanism are discussed below. 
4.2.1 Public understanding and acceptance of the objective  
Where  public understanding and acceptance of the environmental objective is low 
regulation that makes participation in the mechanism compulsory may entail high 
transaction costs, for example due to high monitoring and enforcement costs. Cap and 
trade and offsets systems both involve regulation that causes the relevant parties to   27 
interact to achieve the objective. The extent of public understanding and acceptance 
of the environmental issue and objective influences the transaction costs associated 
with the regulation, and thus the mechanism. Where there is not necessarily 
widespread understanding and acceptance of the need for the land holders involved to 
bare the costs of achieving the objective an MBI that uses voluntary participation to 
determine the lowest cost provision of the environmental outcome, such as an auction, 
may be more likely to achieve the objective at minimum transaction cost. 
4.2.2 Costs associated with measuring the unit of exchange  
Different mechanisms involve trades of different magnitudes of the environmental 
outcome occurring with different regularity. In a cap and trade system for example, a 
small quantity of an environmental good may b e traded frequently by many 
participants in the mechanism. Offset and auction systems tend to involve once-off 
trades to exchange a contract that will deliver the environmental good.  Some 
transaction costs are fixed for the implementation of a mechanisms, whereas others 
are attached to individual trades. Where transaction costs associated with each trade 
or exchange are higher, the impact on the net cost of a mechanism that requires 
frequent trading that each have a small impact on the environmental outcome will be 
greater than the impact on the net cost of a mechanism that makes fewer trades to 
reach the environmental objective. 
Where complex or time-consuming processes are required in order to trade or 
exchange contracts transaction costs of mechanisms that rely on frequent small scale 
trades will increase disproportionately compared to other mechanisms. If it is costly to 
measure the unit of environmental good, for example where trades must be made on a 
‘like for like’ basis and it is complex (costly) to determine a ‘like for like’ unit, the net   28 
cost of a mechanism relying on frequent small scale trades becomes very high 
compared to the net cost of mechanisms such as auctions and offsets systems that are 
based on once-off exchanges.  
4.2.3 Land holder knowledge of producing the environmental good 
Where land holders have  access to  good knowledge about the production of 
environmental outcomes, for example, about the alternative actions that produce 
environmental outcomes and the relative amount of environmental good produced by 
different actions, it will be less costly for  them  to make trade decisions based on the 
production of private goods relative to that of environmental goods.  Here transaction 
costs associated with each trade decision  may be small enough  that land holders will 
determine the most valuable trades and a cap and trade system may be cost effective. 
Where land holders do not have access to this information the transaction costs 
associated with a mechanism that relies on  frequent trades  increase 
disproportionately.  
4.2.4 The number of players involved in supply and/or demand 
Different mechanisms require different numbers of participants on the demand and/or 
the supply side to create the competition necessary to deliver an efficient outcome.  
For example, auctions for conservation contracts require sufficient supply to ensure 
opportunity costs are revealed truthfully. Cap and trade and offsets systems require 
sufficient heterogenous participants to create trades that produce enough value for the 
mechanism to be cost effective.     29 
4.3 Summary of the Appropriateness of Mechanisms 
Table 2 summarises the implications that each of the above commonly relevant 
characteristics may have on auctions, offsets and cap and trade systems.  Where: 
•  Public Acceptance   – relates to the impact that public understanding and 
acceptance of the environmental objective and the policy tool influences the 
extent to which parties adhere to regulation and contracts. 
•  Landholder Production Knowledge – relates to the impact that the extent of 
landholder knowledge about producing the environmental good has on the 
transaction cost required to transfer this information. 
•  Cost of each trade – relates to the extent of costs associated with measuring 
and monitoring the units of exchange (the environmental good). 
•  Number of participants – relates to the number of players needed to be 
involved in supply and demand within the mechanism. 
This should be interpreted as a guide to the potential transaction cost obstacles that 
these types of mechanism may face if applied in a situation where the characteristic 
was one way or another. 
5 Conclusion 
We now know that where there is a degree of heterogeneity well designed market 
based instruments have the potential to deliver greater benefits at less cost. 
Transaction costs associated with policy tools designed to achieve NRM outcomes 
include those associated with:    30 
•  defining and maintaining property rights such as the cost of monitoring and 
enforcing contracts; 
•  addressing information asymmetries including scientific measurement costs 
and the cost of implementing the economic instrument employed; and, 
•  solving  packaging problems through allowing increased information 
exchange, such as software systems involving continuous and simultaneous 
allocations, or the u se of multiple rounds. 
As the transaction costs associated with new mechanisms continue to decrease market 
based instruments will offer greater efficiency gains to the economy.  
Where the objective is clear, and the knowledge, skills and capability exist t o 
understand the relevant characteristics of the problem and model and measure the 
environmental outcome involved economists  now have better potential to design 
market based instruments that efficiently match demand with supply.  
Transaction costs associated with identifying and aggregating individual members of 
the community’s preferences remain.  Public good characteristics, a lack of familiarity 
with purchasing environmental goods, and lack of information and understanding 
about the contribution that different amounts of different environmental goods make 
to their utility mean that individuals’ abilities and incentives to identify and reveal this 
information  accurately are weak. Political processes, voluntary contributions, stated 
preference and contingent valuation techniques may provide estimates, however they 
are often costly and may not provide estimates with a significant degree of 
confidence.  The increased adoption of market based instruments highlights the need 
to improve our ability to identify willingness to pay for different environmental   31 
outcomes. Without  the ability to better identify demand, the overall  efficiency of 
environmental  policy tool may be questioned.  
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Tables 
Table 1. Summary of Pilot Characteristics 
  Method  Natural Resource Management Focus  Funding  
 




Salinity  Water 
quality 
Biodiversity  Carbon  (% total) 
Auction  4  1  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  33 
Cap and 
Trade** 
1  3  ￿  ￿      17 
Offset  1    ￿        12 
Insurance*  1            2 
Leverage   1    ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  36 
Total   7  4          100 
* The insurance pilot’s focus was primarily wind erosion, and this was a desk based pilot. 
** One cap and trade pilot involved both experiments and a field component.  
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Table 2. The Appropriateness of Cap-and-Trade, Auctions and Offsets Systems 
    Cap and Trade  Offsets  Auctions 
High  May be appropriate 
(low TCs from 
regulation)  
May be appropriate 
(low TCs from 
regulation) 
May be appropriate 
(should get sufficient 
interest for supply) 
Public 
Acceptance 
Low  Not likely to be 
appropriate (cost of 
regulation high) 
Not likely to be 
appropriate (cost of 
regulation high) 
May be appropriate (as 
long as get sufficient 
interest) 
High  May be appropriate 
(lower cost of 
landholder trades) 
May be appropriate   May be appropriate  Landholder 
Production 
Knowledge 
Low  Less likely to be 
appropriate (trades 
more costly) 
May be appropriate 
(if info can be 
provided at 
reasonable cost given 
one-off trades) 
May be appropriate (if 
info can be provided at 
reasonable cost given 
one-off trades) 
High   Not likely to be 
appropriate  
May be appropriate   May be appropriate  Cost of each 
trade 
Low  May be appropriate  May be appropriate 
(given one-off trades) 
May be appropriate 
(given -off trades) 
Demand   Sufficient 
heterogeneous 
participants needed 
to capture value 
from trades 
Sufficient demand 








Supply  Same as above  Sufficient supply to 
meet demand 
Enough supply to create 
comypetition necessary 
 